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Symposium abstract 
 
A growing number of moral philosophers and scientists draw on scientific knowledge concerning 
‘human nature’ to readdress meta-ethical and normative questions. In this symposium, we 
investigate our ‘evolved moral nature’ and we consider the impact of this knowledge on moral 
philosophy. First, we explore the building blocks of moral behaviour; second, we focus on 
individual differences in moral psychology. 
Several key aspects of our moral sense are shared with other primates. But are these 
shared moral sentiments sufficient to speak about a moral sense? We discuss differences between 
primate and human moral behavior. Further, we describe and evaluate some of the proposed 
building blocks of morality in primates, such as a sense of fairness, social norms, moralistic 
aggression or altruism. 
With regard to altruistic motivation, the 18th century conflict between reason and affect 
seems to be replaced by a more nuanced opposition between top-down and bottom-up pathways. 
In this context we explore recent findings on children’s development of prosocial behavior. Then, 
we discuss whether and how this opposition is taken into account in current moral philosophy. 
Evolutionary theory predicts that individual differences occur with regard to our moral 
intuitions, depending on the sex, age and ecology of the actor. Specific predictions have been 
corroborated by psychological studies. This contrasts with the classic moral philosophers’ 
ambition to build universal normative systems instead of collecting actor-dependent moral rules. 
The implications of this conflict for normative ethics are explored. Are we heading for a 
‘relativistic turn’ in ethics? 
 
 
 
Talks: titles and abstracts  
 
 
What can our closest living relatives tell us about the evolution of morality? 
 
Adrian V. Jaeggi & Claudia Rudolf von Rohr 
 
Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Zurich 
Graduate Program for Interdisciplinary Research in Ethics, University of Zurich 
 
Apes have been suggested to have some of the basic prerequisites of human morality. The aim of 
our studies was to describe the exact nature of such proposed prerequisites, in particular altruism 
and social norms. Altruistic acts among humans are characterized by a desire to help others 
according to their needs. Altruistic behavior among chimpanzees and bonobos was investigated in 
the context of food sharing. We tried to assess the psychological mechanisms behind this 
apparently altruistic behavior and the biological conditions under which it may evolve. The 
presence of social norms among humans can be inferred when unaffected bystanders react 
negatively towards their violation. Chimpanzees protest when becoming themselves victims of 
norm violations. However, such protests are primarily based on “egoistic” norms. To establish the 
presence of social norms among chimpanzees, we investigated whether they, like humans, also 
show reactions as unaffected bystanders. The results show that (1) apes rarely share food in an 
altruistic way and may respond to others’ solicitations only if their sharing is likely to be 
reciprocated and (2) that chimpanzees differentially perceive and evaluate social events as 
completely unaffected bystanders and therefore satisfy a basic prerequisite for the presence of 
social norms. In sum, such studies may help to explain the evolution of human morality and the 
related psychological mechanisms. Thus, it may be interesting for moral philosophers to think of 
morality as the product of cultural but also evolutionary history, which may have implications for 
moral philosophy. 
 
 
Sympathy and moral evaluations as mediators of young children’s prosocial behavior 
 
Amrisha Vaish  
 
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig 
 
Young children behave prosocially, but do they do so discriminately, that is, based upon the 
other’s circumstances or moral behaviors? To test this, we examined children’s prosocial 
behavior toward victims and perpetrators. 
Study 1 assessed whether, in the absence of distress cues from a victim, children can 
nonetheless sympathize with the victim. We showed 1.5- and 2-year-olds a ‘perpetrator’ either 
harming a ‘victim’ by destroying or taking her possessions (Harm condition) or doing something 
similar but not harming her (Neutral condition). The victim expressed no emotions in either 
condition. Nevertheless, more children showed sympathy (p=.011) and prosocial behavior 
(p=.024) toward the victim in the Harm than the Neutral condition, and children’s sympathy 
correlated with their prosocial behavior, p=.036. Thus, despite the lack of emotional cues from 
the victim, children sympathized with and showed greater prosocial behavior toward her, perhaps 
through affective perspective-taking. 
Study 2 examined children’s prosocial behavior toward perpetrators. After 3-year-olds 
witnessed the Harm condition (as in Study 1 except the victim displayed sadness), they had to 
decide between helping the perpetrator or a neutral person (i.e., not the victim but a third adult). 
Fewer children helped the perpetrator than the neutral person, p<.0005. Moreover, when the 
perpetrator intended to but could not harm the victim, 3-year-olds still helped the perpetrator less 
than the neutral person, p=.008, whereas when the perpetrator accidentally harmed the victim, 
children did not help differentially, p=.204.  
In conclusion, young children’s prosocial behavior is mediated by their sympathy for and 
moral evaluations of the beneficiary. 
 
 
Empathy and the nature of altruistic motivation: the rationalism-sentimentalism debate revisited? 
 
Jelle De Schrijver 
 
Ghent University, research group ‘The Moral Brain’ 
 
Converging evidence from evolutionary sciences, developmental, moral and social psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience allows us to see the nature of altruistic motivation in a different light. 
Empathy - which is often regarded as a multipolar construct with both affective and cognitive 
aspects - is ascribed a central role in this mechanism of altruistic motivation. It is the aim of this 
paper to explore the processes allowing empathy to elicit altruistic motivation. Recently, two 
types of models have been developed. Whereas bottom-up models emphasize the role of the 
affective aspects of empathy, top-down models stress, in addition, the role of higher cognitive 
processes such as theory of mind and emotion regulation. The former conflict between reason and 
affect as was fought out among 18th century rationalists and sentimentalists seems to be replaced 
by a more nuanced opposition between top-down and bottom-up approaches.  
 
 
Is it time for a relativist turn in ethics? 
 
Katinka Quintelier  
 
Ghent University, research group ‘The Moral Brain’ 
 
Recent developments in moral psychology and in evolutionary theories of moral behavior focus 
on individual and group differences in morality. Moral intuitions may differ depending on sex, 
age, ecology and evolutionary strategy of the individual. Within the individual, different and 
mutually incompatible moral intuitions are triggered depending on specific aspects of the 
situation (see, e.g., Haidt, 2007; Greene et al., 2004). Thus there exist interindividual and 
intraindividual differences in moral intuitions. 
This diversity of our moral intuitions has led naturalistic and evolutionary ethicists to 
question normative theories that articulate universal and mutually consistent moral principles. For 
example, E.O. Wilson has suggested that we cannot impose a single set of moral standards on all 
human populations or sex-age classes, for this would “create complex, intractable moral 
dilemmas” (Wilson 1975, p. 564). On the other hand, if we are not all in the same game, living 
together may not work very well (see, e.g., Ruse, 2008), especially if we conceive of moral 
principles as universally valid. There seems to be a trade-off between moral principles that are 
intuitively acceptable and moral principles that are universally valid.  
The literature on naturalistic and evolutionary ethics discusses which implications 
scientific data can and cannot have on normative questions. I critically apply this discussion to the 
topic of normative implications of inter- and intraindividual differences in moral intuitions.  
